OURS: optimal unicast routing systems in non-cooperative wireless networks

We propose novel solutions for unicast routing in wireless networks consisted of selfish terminals: in order to alleviate the inevitable over-payment problem (and thus economic inefficiency) of the VCG (Vickrey-Clark-Groves) mechanism, we design a mechanism that results in Nash equilibria rather than the traditional strategyproofness (using weakly dominant strategy). In addition, we systematically study the unicast routing system in which both the relay terminals and the service requestor (either the source or the destination nodes or both) could be selfish. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that presents social efficient unicast routing systems with proved performance guarantee. Thus, we call the proposed systems: Optimal Unicast Routing Systems (OURS). Our main contributions of OURS are as follows. (1) For the principal model where the service requestor is not selfish, we propose a mechanism that provably creates incentives for intermediate terminals to coo...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2006
• Where: MOBICOM
• Authors: Weizhao Wang, Xiang-Yang Li, Stephan Eidenbenz, Yu Wang 0003
• Keywords: MOBICOM 2006, Service Requestor, Unicast Routing, Unicast Routing Systems