Multi-user collusion is an cost-effective attack against digital fingerprinting, in which a group of attackers collectively undermine the traitor tracing capability of digital fingerprints. However, during multi-user collusion, each colluder wishes to minimize his/her own risk and maximize his/her own profit, and different colluders have different objectives. Thus, an important issue during collusion is to agree on how to distribute the risk/profit among colluders and ensure fairness of the attack. To have a better understanding of the attackers' behavior during collusion to achieve fairness, this paper models the dynamics among colluders as a non-cooperative game. We then study the Pareto-Optimal set, where no colluder can further increase his/her own payoff without decreasing others', and analyze the Nash Bargaining solution of this game.
Wan-Yi Sabrina Lin, H. Vicky Zhao, K. J. Ray Liu