Co-evolutionary Strategies for an Alternating-Offer Bargaining Problem

Abstract- In this paper, we apply an Evolutionary Algorithm (EA) to solve the Rubinstein’s Basic AlternatingOffer Bargaining Problem, and compare our experimental results with its analytic game-theoretic solution. The application of EA employs an alternative set of assumptions on the players’ behaviors. Experimental outcomes suggest that the applied co-evolutionary algorithm, one of Evolutionary Algorithms, is able to generate convincing approximations of the theoretic solutions. The major advantages of EA over the game-theoretic analysis are its flexibility and ease of application to variants of Rubinstein Bargaining Problems and complicated bargaining situations for which theoretic solutions are unavailable.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2005
• Where: CIG
• Authors: Nanlin Jin, Edward P. K. Tsang
• Keywords: Analytic Game-theoretic Solution, Bargaining Problems, CIG 2005, Evolutionary Algorithms