Abstract. In update logic the interpretation of an action is often assumed to be independent from the agents’ beliefs about the situation (see [BMS04] or [Auc05]). In this paper we deal with this type of phenomenon. We also deal with actions that change facts of the situation. We use probability to model the notion of belief and our probabilistic update mechanism satisfies the AGM postulates of belief revision. Often in everyday life we interpret an action on the basis of our beliefs about the situation. For example, assume that you see somebody drawing a ball from an urn containing black balls and white balls. If you believe there is no particular distribution in the urn then you will consider it equally probable that he draws a white ball or a black ball; but if you believe there are more black than white balls in the urn then you will consider it more probable than he draws a black ball than a white ball: the interpretation of the same action is different in both cases. The lite...