A decentralized bargaining protocol on dependent continuous multi-issue for approximate pareto optimal outcomes

Negotiation techniques have been demonstrated to be effective in solving complex multi-objective problems. When the optimization process operates on continuous variables, it can be tackled by agents bargaining with different objectives. However, the complexity of highly reconfigurable scenarios with a large number of agents does not allow the adoption of classical game theory techniques to design optimal negotiation protocols [2]. We present a decentralized bargaining protocol on dependent continuous multi-issue that produces approximate Pareto optimal outcomes between two agents. Categories and Subject Descriptors I.2.11 [Distributed Artificial Intelligence]: Multiagent Systems; G.4 [Mathematical Software]: Algorithm Design and Analysis. General Terms Algorithms, Economics, Experimentation. Keywords Decentralized Bargaining, Nash Bargaining Solution, Pareto Optimality.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2005
• Where: ATAL
• Authors: Nicola Gatti, Francesco Amigoni
• Keywords: ATAL 2005, Decentralized Bargaining, Decentralized Bargaining Protocol, Nash Bargaining Solution