Adaptive limited-supply online auctions

We study a limited-supply online auction problem, in which an auctioneer has k goods to sell and bidders arrive and depart dynamically. We suppose that agent valuations are drawn independently from some unknown distribution and construct an adaptive auction that is nevertheless value- and time-strategyproof. For the k = 1 problem we have a strategyproof variant on the classic secretary problem. We present a 4-competitive (e-competitive) strategyproof online algorithm with respect to offline Vickrey for revenue (efficiency). We also show (in a model that slightly generalizes the assumption of independent valuations) that no mechanism can be better than 3/2-competitive (2-competitive) for revenue (efficiency). Our general approach considers a learning phase followed by an accepting phase, and is careful to handle incentive issues for agents that span the two phases. We extend to the k > 1 case, by deriving strategyproof mechanisms which are constant-competitive for revenue and ef�...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2004
• Where: SIGECOM
• Authors: Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, David C. Parkes
• Keywords: Classic Secretary Problem, Online Auction Problem, SIGECOM 2004, Strategyproof Online Algorithm