A game theoretic approach to provide incentive and service differentiation in P2P networks

Traditional Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks do not provide service differentiation and incentive for users. Consequently, users can easily access information without contributing any information or service to a P2P community. This leads to the “free-riding” problem and consequently, most of the information requests are directed toward a small number of P2P nodeswhich are willing to share information or to provide service, hence, the “tragedy of the commons” occurs. The aim of this work is to provide service differentiation based on the amount of services each node has provided to a P2P community. Since the differentiation is based on the amount of contribution, this encourages all nodes to share information/services in a P2P network. We first introduce a resource distribution mechanism for all information sharing nodes. This mechanism is a distributed algorithm which has a linear time complexity and guarantees the “Pareto-optimal” resource allocation. In addition, the mechani...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2004
• Where: SIGMETRICS
• Authors: Richard T. B. Ma, Sam C. M. Lee, John C. S. Lui, David K. Y. Yau
• Keywords: P2P Community, P2P Network, P2P Nodeswhich, SIGMETRICS 2004