One-Round Protocols for Two-Party Authenticated Key Exchange

Cryptographic protocol design in a two-party setting has often ignored the possibility of simultaneous message transmission by each of the two parties (i.e., using a duplex channel). In particular, most protocols for two-party key exchange have been designed assuming that parties alternate sending their messages (i.e., assuming a bidirectional half-duplex channel). However, by taking advantage of the communication characteristics of the network it may be possible to design protocols with improved latency. This is the focus of the present work. We present three provably-secure protocols for two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) which require only a single round. Our first, most efficient protocol provides key independence but not forward secrecy. Our second scheme additionally provides forward secrecy but requires some additional computation. Security of these two protocols is analyzed in the random oracle model. Our final protocol provides even stronger security guarantees than...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2004
• Where: ACNS
• Authors: Ik Rae Jeong, Jonathan Katz, Dong Hoon Lee
• Keywords: ACNS 2004, Cryptographic Protocol Design, Cryptography, Two-party Key Exchange, Two-party Setting