Approximate Solutions for Partially Observable Stochastic Games with Common Payoffs

Partially observable decentralized decision making in robot teams is fundamentally different from decision making in fully observable problems. Team members cannot simply apply single-agent solution techniques in parallel. Instead, we must turn to game theoretic frameworks to correctly model the problem. While partially observable stochastic games (POSGs) provide a solution model for decentralized robot teams, this model quickly becomes intractable. We propose an algorithm that approximates POSGs as a series of smaller, related Bayesian games, using heuristics such as ¢¤£¦¥¨§ to provide the future discounted value of actions. This algorithm trades off limited look-ahead in uncertainty for computational feasibility, and results in policies that are locally optimal with respect to the selected heuristic. Empirical results are provided for both a simple problem for which the full POSG can also be constructed, as well as more complex, robot-inspired, problems.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2004
• Where: ATAL
• Authors: Rosemary Emery-Montemerlo, Geoffrey J. Gordon, Jeff G. Schneider, Sebastian Thrun
• Keywords: ATAL 2004, Decision Making, Observable Decentralized Decision, Robot Teams