Quantum 2-party cryptography differs from its classical counterpart in at least one important way: Given blak-box access to a perfect commitment scheme there exists a secure 1−2 quantum oblivious transfer. This reduction proposed by Cr´epeau and Kilian was proved secure against any receiver by Yao, in the case where perfect commitments are used. However, quantum commitments would normally be based on computational assumptions. A natural question therefore arises: What happens to the security of the above reduction when computationally secure commitments are used instead of perfect ones? In this paper, we address the security of 1−2 QOT when computationally binding string commitments are available. In particular, we analyse the security of a primitive called Quantum Measurement Commitment when it is constructed from unconditionally concealing but computationally binding commitments. As measuring a quantum state induces an irreversible collapse, we describe a QMC as an instance of ...