Ranking games that have competitiveness-based strategies

This paper studies —from the perspective of efficient computation— a type of competition that is widespread throughout the plant and animal kingdoms, higher education, politics and artificial contests. In this setting, an agent gains utility from his relative performance (on some measurable criterion) against other agents, as opposed to his absolute performance. We model this situation using ranking games in which each strategy corresponds to a level of competitiveness, and incurs an upfront cost that is higher for more competitive strategies. We study the Nash equilibria of these games, and polynomial-time algorithms for computing them. For games in which there is no tie between agents’ levels of competitiveness we give a polynomial-time algorithm for computing an exact equilibrium in the 2-player case, and a characterization of Nash equilibria that shows an interesting parallel between these games and unrestricted 2-player games in normal form. When ties are allowed, via a re...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2010
• Where: SIGECOM
• Authors: Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldberg, Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre
• Keywords: ECommerce, Nash Equilibria, Polynomial-time Algorithm, Polynomial-time Approximation Scheme, SIGECOM 2010