Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Based on RSA

Abstract. There have been many proposals in recent years for passwordauthenticated key exchange protocols. Many of these have been shown to be insecure, and the only ones that seemed likely to be proven secure (against active adversaries who may attempt to perform off-line dictionary attacks against the password) were based on the Diffie-Hellman problem. In fact, some protocols based on Diffie-Hellman have been recently proven secure in the random-oracle model. We examine how to design a provably-secure password-authenticated key exchange protocol based on RSA. We first look at the OKE and protected-OKE protocols (both RSA-based) and show that they are insecure. Then we show how to modify the OKE protocol to obtain a password-authenticated key exchange protocol that can be proven secure (in the random oracle model). The resulting protocol is very practical; in fact the basic protocol requires about the same amount of computation as the Diffie-Hellman-based protocols or the well-known...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2000
• Where: ASIACRYPT
• Authors: Philip D. MacKenzie, Sarvar Patel, Ram Swaminathan
• Keywords: ASIACRYPT 2000, Cryptology, Key Exchange Protocol, Off-line Dictionary Attacks, Password-authenticated Key Exchange