Equivalent Keys of HPC

This paper presents a weakness in the key schedule of the AES candidate HPC (Hasty Pudding Cipher). It is shown that for the HPC version with a 128-bit key, 1 in 256 keys is weak in the sense that it has 230 equivalent keys. An efficient algorithm is proposed to construct these weak keys and the corresponding equivalent keys. If a weak key is used, it can be recovered by exhaustive search trying only 289 keys on average. This is an improvement by a factor of 238 over a normal exhaustive key search, which requires on average 2127 attempts. The weakness also implies that HPC cannot be used in standard constructions for hash functions based on block ciphers. The analysis is extended to HPC with a 192-bit key and a 256-bit key, with similar results. For some other key lengths, all keys are shown to be weak. An example of this is the HPC variant with a 56-bit user key and block length of 128 bits, which can be broken in 231 attempts on average.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 1999
• Where: ASIACRYPT
• Authors: Carl D'Halluin, Gert Bijnens, Bart Preneel, Vincent Rijmen
• Keywords: Aes Candidate Hpc, ASIACRYPT 1999, Cryptology, Equivalent Keys, Weak Key