Cooperative vs. Competitive Multi-Agent Negotiations in Retail Electronic Commerce

A key lesson learned from economic and game theory research is that negotiation protocols have substantial, rippling effects on the overall nature of the system. online auctions are increasingly popular negotiation protocols for software agents (and humans) to compete on the prices of goods and services. This paper takes a critical look at these competitive protocols in retail markets from economic, game theoretic, and business perspectives. Our analysis suggests that online auction protocols are, in fact, less efficient and more hostile than would be expected (or desired) in retail markets. Furthermore, we identify the importance of customer satisfaction and propose more cooperative multiagent decision analysis tools (e..g, Multi-Attribute Utility Theory) and negotiation protocols (e.g., Distributed Constraint Satisfaction) as promising techniques to support it.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 1998
• Where: CIA
• Authors: Robert H. Guttman, Pattie Maes
• Keywords: CIA 1998, Intelligent Agents, Negotiation Protocols, Popular Negotiation Protocols, Retail Markets