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EUROPKI
2006
Springer

On the Resilience of Key Agreement Protocols to Key Compromise Impersonation

14 years 3 months ago
On the Resilience of Key Agreement Protocols to Key Compromise Impersonation
Abstract. Key agreement protocols are a fundamental building block for ensuring authenticated and private communications between two parties over an insecure network. This paper focuses on key agreement protocols in the asymmetric authentication model, wherein parties hold a public/private key pair. In particular, we consider a type of known key attack called key compromise impersonation that may occur once the adversary has obtained the private key of an honest party. This attack represents a subtle threat that is often underestimated and difficult to counter. Several protocols are shown vulnerable to this attack despite their authors claiming the opposite. We also consider in more detail how three formal (complexity-theoretic based) models of distributed computing found in the literature cover such attacks. Key words:key compromise impersonation, key agreement protocols
Maurizio Adriano Strangio
Added 22 Aug 2010
Updated 22 Aug 2010
Type Conference
Year 2006
Where EUROPKI
Authors Maurizio Adriano Strangio
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