Computationally Sound Symbolic Secrecy in the Presence of Hash Functions

The standard symbolic, deducibility-based notions of secrecy are in general insufficient from a cryptographic point of view, especially in presence of hash functions. In this paper we devise and motivate a more appropriate secrecy criterion which exactly captures a standard cryptographic notion of secrecy for protocols involving public-key enryption and hash functions: protocols that satisfy it are computationally secure while any violation of our criterion directly leads to an attack. Furthermore, we prove that our criterion is decidable via an NP decision procedure. Our results hold for standard security notions for encryption and hash functions modeled as random oracles.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2006
• Where: FSTTCS
• Authors: Véronique Cortier, Steve Kremer, Ralf Küsters, Bogdan Warinschi
• Keywords: Appropriate Secrecy Criterion, FSTTCS 2006, Hash Functions, Secrecy, Software Engineering