Much of the debate on cryptography has assumed that the real tension is between the state’s desire for effective policing and the privacy of the individual. We argue that this is misguided. Very few fielded cryptosystems are concerned with secrecy: systems such as automatic teller machines, prepayment electricity meters and satellite TV decoders use crypto to prevent fraud, and the operators of these systems have enough clout to make restrictions on crypto a problem for governments. Last year, for example, the Dutch government had to back down from proposals to restrict civilian cryptography, and John Major has recently said that no further restrictions are envisaged in the UK. The really serious problem for developers of commercial cryptosystems is quite different: it is that cryptography is very difficult to use in evidence. There are simple legal tactics which can undermine any claim to the effect that ‘our system is secure’, and their use has led to a series of cases in w...
Ross J. Anderson