Deployed ARMOR protection: the application of a game theoretic model for security at the Los Angeles International Airport

Security at major locations of economic or political importance is a key concern around the world, particularly given the threat of terrorism. Limited security resources prevent full security coverage at all times, which allows adversaries to observe and exploit patterns in selective patrolling or monitoring, e.g. they can plan an attack avoiding existing patrols. Hence, randomized patrolling or monitoring is important, but randomization must provide distinct weights to different actions based on their complex costs and benefits. To this end, this paper describes a promising transition of the latest in multi-agent algorithms

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2008
• Where: ATAL
• Authors: James Pita, Manish Jain, Janusz Marecki, Fernando Ordóñez, Christopher Portway, Milind Tambe, Craig Western, Praveen Paruchuri, Sarit Kraus
• Keywords: Agent Called Armor, ATAL 2008, Bayesian Stackelberg Games, Intelligent Agents, Overall Desired Randomization