A Compact Representation Scheme for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments

Coalition formation is an important capability of automated negotiation among self-interested agents. In order for coalitions to be stable, a key question that must be answered is how the gains from cooperation are to be distributed. Recent research has revealed that traditional solution concepts, such as the Shapley value, core, least core, and nucleolus, are vulnerable to various manipulations in open anonymous environments such as the Internet. These manipulations include submitting false names, collusion, and hiding some skills. To address this, a solution concept called the anonymityproof core, which is robust against such manipulations, was developed. However, the representation size of the outcome function in the anonymity-proof core (and similar concepts) requires space exponential in the number of agents/skills. This paper proposes a compact representation of the outcome function, given that the characteristic function is represented using a recently introduced compact langua...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2006
• Where: AAAI
• Authors: Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Kohki Maruono, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
• Keywords: AAAI 2006, Compact Representation, Intelligent Agents, Outcome Function, Solution Concept