Economic mechanism design for securing online auctions

Enhancing e-commerce security through computing technology alone is not sufficient. E-commerce designers should apply economic mechanisms to design proper digital processes that accommodate new perspectives raised in e-commerce. For instance, traditional auction mechanisms, such as the Generalized Vickrey Auction, are vulnerable to false-name bidding, an online fraud exploiting the lack of authentication over the Internet. We develop a Sealed-bid Multi-round Auction Protocol (S-MAP), which sells multi-unit identical goods. SMAP is not only robust against false-name bidding but also simple and efficient.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2000
• Where: ICIS
• Authors: Wenli Wang, Zoltán Hidvégi, Andrew B. Whinston
• Keywords: False-name Bidding, ICIS 2000, ICIS 2001, Sealed-bid Multi-round Auction, Traditional Auction Mechanisms