Leakage-Resilient Pseudorandom Functions and Side-Channel Attacks on Feistel Networks

Abstract. A cryptographic primitive is leakage-resilient, if it remains secure even if an adversary can learn a bounded amount of arbitrary information about the computation with every invocation. As a consequence, the physical implementation of a leakage-resilient primitive is secure against every side-channel as long as the amount of information leaked per invocation is bounded. In this paper we prove positive and negative results about the feasibility of constructing leakage-resilient pseudorandom functions and permutations (i.e. block-ciphers). Our results are three fold:

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2010
• Where: CRYPTO
• Authors: Yevgeniy Dodis, Krzysztof Pietrzak
• Keywords: Arbitrary Information, CRYPTO 2010, Cryptographic Primitive, Cryptology, Leakage-resilient Pseudorandom Functions