Evolutionary mechanism design: a review

Abstract The advent of large-scale distributed systems poses unique engineering challenges. In open systems such as the internet it is not possible to prescribe the behaviour of all of the components of the system in advance. Rather, we attempt to design infrastructure, such as network protocols, in such a way that the overall system is robust despite the fact that numerous arbitrary, non-certified, third-party components can connect to our system. Economists have long understood this issue, since it is analogous to the design of the rules governing auctions and other marketplaces, in which we attempt to achieve sociallydesirable outcomes despite the impossibility of prescribing the exact behaviour of the market participants, who may attempt to subvert the market for their own personal gain. This field is known as "mechanism design": the science of designing rules of a game to achieve a specific outcome, even though each participant may be self-interested. Although it origina...

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2010
• Where: AAMAS
• Authors: Steve Phelps, Peter McBurney, Simon Parsons
• Keywords: AAMAS 2010, Intelligent Agents, Large-scale Distributed Systems, Mechanism Design, Traditional Mechanism Design