Reasoning About Knowledge of Unawareness

Awareness has been shown to be a useful addition to standard epistemic logic for many applications. However, standard propositional logics for knowledge and awareness cannot express the fact that an agent knows that there are facts of which he is unaware without there being an explicit fact that the agent knows he is unaware of. We propose a logic for reasoning about knowledge of unawareness, by extending the Logic of General Awareness [Fagin and Halpern 1988]. The logic allows quantification over variables, so that "agent i explicitly knows that there exists a fact of which he is unaware" can be expressed as Xi(x

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2006
• Where: CORR
• Authors: Joseph Y. Halpern, Leandro Chaves Rêgo
• Keywords: CORR 2006, Education, Logic, Standard Epistemic Logic, Standard Propositional Logics