An auction mechanism for allocating the bandwidth of networks to their users

We present a mechanism for auctioning bandwidth on a network-wide basis to end users or ISPs that will utilize it for the same time period. This mechanism consists of a set of simultaneous multi-unit descending-price (i.e. Dutch) auctions, one per link of the network. The per unit prices of bandwidth at the various links are asymmetric, thus reflecting the asymmetry of demand for these links. A user can be instantly allocated bandwidth over a certain path, by simultaneously bidding for the quantity desired at all relevant auctions. This winner determination rule is complemented by a payment rule of the VCG (Vickrey–Clarke–Groves) type, which provides users with the incentive to bid truthfully, thus simplifying bidding. Also, the mechanism enables the auctioneer to use his prior information on market demand anticipated and its spreading among the various links in order to set effectively the auction’s parameters. We argue that our mechanism attains nearly efficient allocation o...

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2007
• Where: CN
• Authors: Manos Dramitinos, George D. Stamoulis, Costas Courcoubetis
• Keywords: CN 2007, Simultaneous Multi-unit Descending-price, Social Welfare, Various Links