Sequential Bandwidth and Power Auctions for Distributed Spectrum Sharing

We study a sequential auction for sharing a wireless resource (bandwidth or power) among competing transmitters. The resource is assumed to be managed by a spectrum broker (auctioneer), who collects bids and allocates discrete units of the resource via a sequential second-price auction. It is well known that a second price auction for a single indivisible good has an efficient dominant strategy equilibrium; this is no longer the case when multiple units of a homogeneous good are sold in repeated iterations. For two users with full information, we show that such an auction has a unique equilibrium allocation. The worst-case efficiency of this allocation is characterized under the following cases: (i) both bidders have a concave valuation for the spectrum resource, and (ii) one bidder has a concave valuation and the other bidder has a convex valuation (e.g., for the other user's power). Although the worst-case efficiency loss can be significant, numerical results are presented, whic...

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2008
• Where: JSAC
• Authors: Junjik Bae, Eyal Beigman, Randall A. Berry, Michael L. Honig, Rakesh V. Vohra
• Keywords: Concave Valuation, JSAC 2008, Sequential Second-price Auction, Worst-case Efficiency