The current Internet architecture comprises of different privately owned Internet service providers (ISPs) where higher tier ISPs supply connectivity service to lower tier ISPs and charge these ISPs for the transit service. For the higher tier ISPs, the main concern is how to increase the profit by attracting more lower tier ISPs (or traffic), while the lower tier ISPs concern about the connectivity, quality of service as well as the cost of the transit service. In this work, we seek to understand the interaction between different tiers of ISPs. Note that the lower tier ISPs can transmit traffic to each other, either by purchasing the service from higher tier ISPs, or by setting "private peering links" between themselves. Higher tier ISPs, on the other hand, cannot charge the transit service at will since there is competition among higher tier ISPs. We model the interaction of these ISPs via a game theoretic approach. We study the issues of (a) impact of private peering rela...
Sam C. M. Lee, John C. S. Lui