Inefficient Noncooperation in Networking Games of Common-Pool Resources

We study in this paper a noncooperative approach for sharing resources of a common pool among users, wherein each user strives to maximize its own utility. The optimality notion is then a Nash equilibrium. First, we present a general framework of systems wherein a Nash equilibrium is Pareto inefficient, which are similar to the `tragedy of the commons' in economics. As examples that fit in the above framework, we consider noncooperative flow-control problems in communication networks where each user decides its throughput to optimize its own utility. As such a utility, we first consider the power which is defined as the throughput divided by the expected end-to-end packet delay, and then consider another utility of additive costs. For both utilities, we establish the non-efficiency of the Nash equilibria.

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2008
• Where: JSAC
• Authors: Hisao Kameda, Eitan Altman
• Keywords: JSAC 2008, Nash Equilibrium, Noncooperative Approach, Noncooperative Flow-control Problems