Secure group key establishment revisited

Abstract. We examine the popular proof models for group key establishment of Bresson et al. [BCPQ01,BCP01] and point out missing security properties addressing malicious protocol participants. We show that established group key establishment schemes from CRYPTO 2003 and ASIACRYPT 2004 do not fully meet these new requirements. Next to giving a formal definition of these extended security properties, we prove a variant of the explored proposal from ASIACRYPT 2004 secure in this stricter sense. Our proof builds on the Computational Diffie Hellman (CDH) assumption and the random oracle model.

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2007
• Where: IJISEC
• Authors: Jens-Matthias Bohli, Maria Isabel Gonzalez Vasco, Rainer Steinwandt
• Keywords: Group Key Establishment, IJISEC 2007, Popular Proof Models, Security Properties