Improved Lower Bounds on the Price of Stability of Undirected Network Design Games

Abstract. Bounding the price of stability of undirected network design games with fair cost allocation is a challenging open problem in the Algorithmic Game Theory research agenda. Even though the generalization of such games in directed networks is well understood in terms of the price of stability (it is exactly Hn, the n-th harmonic number, for games with n players), far less is known for network design games in undirected networks. The upper bound carries over to this case as well

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2010
• Where: SAGT
• Authors: Vittorio Bilò, Ioannis Caragiannis, Angelo Fanelli, Gianpiero Monaco
• Keywords: Game Theory, Network Design Games, SAGT 2010, Undirected Network Design, Undirected Networks