On the Equilibria of Alternating Move Games

We consider computational aspects of alternating move games, repeated games in which players take actions at alternating time steps rather than playing simultaneously. We show that alternating move games are more tractable than simultaneous move games: we give an FPTAS for computing an -approximate equilibrium of an alternating move game with any number of players. In contrast, it is known that for k ≥ 3 players, there is no FPTAS for computing Nash equilibria of simultaneous move repeated games unless P = PPAD. We also consider equilibria in memoryless strategies, which are guaranteed to exist in two player games. We show that for the special case of k = 2 players, all but a negligible fraction of games admit an equilibrium in pure memoryless strategies that can be found in polynomial time. Moreover, we give a PTAS to compute an approximate equilibrium in pure memoryless strategies in any 2 player game that admits an exact equilibrium in pure memoryless strategies.

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2010
• Where: SODA
• Authors: Aaron Roth, Maria-Florina Balcan, Adam Kalai, Yishay Mansour
• Keywords: Algorithms, Memoryless Strategies, Player Game, Pure Memoryless Strategies, SODA 2010