Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round MIBS Block Cipher

Abstract. This paper presents the first independent and systematic linear, differential and impossible-differential (ID) cryptanalyses of MIBS, a lightweight block cipher aimed at constrained devices such as RFID tags and sensor networks. Our contributions include linear attacks on up to 18-round MIBS, and the first ciphertext-only attacks on 13-round MIBS. Our differential analysis reaches 14 rounds, and our impossibledifferential attack reaches 12 rounds. These attacks do not threaten the full 32-round MIBS, but significantly reduce its margin of security by more than 50%. One fact that attracted our attention is the striking similarity of the round function of MIBS with that of the Camellia block cipher. We actually used this fact in our ID attacks. We hope further similarities will help build better attacks for Camellia as well.

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2010
• Where: CANS
• Authors: Asli Bay, Jorge Nakahara, Serge Vaudenay
• Keywords: 13-round Mibs, 18-round Mibs, Camellia Block Cipher, CANS 2010, Cryptology