Spectrum pricing games with bandwidth uncertainty and spatial reuse in cognitive radio networks

In cognitive radio networks (CRN), primary users can lease out their unused bandwidth to secondary users in return for a fee. We study price competition in a CRN with multiple primaries and multiple secondaries in a region, where each primary tries to attract secondaries by setting a lower price for his bandwidth than other primaries. A CRN has two distinctive features, which makes the price competition very different from that in traditional commodity markets. First, in every slot, each primary may or may not have unused bandwidth available. So primaries are uncertain about the number of other primaries from whom they face competition. Second, spectrum is a commodity that allows spatial reuse: the same band can be simultaneously used at far-off locations without interference; on the other hand, simultaneous transmissions at neighboring locations on the same band interfere with each other. As a result, a primary cannot offer bandwidth at all locations, but must select an independent s...

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2010
• Where: MOBIHOC
• Authors: Gaurav S. Kasbekar, Saswati Sarkar
• Keywords: Computer Networks, Locations, MOBIHOC 2010, Price Competition, Primaries