Mechanism Design-Based Secure Leader Election Model for Intrusion Detection in MANET

—In this paper, we study leader election in the presence of selfish nodes for intrusion detection in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). To balance the resource consumption among all nodes and prolong the lifetime of a MANET, nodes with the most remaining resources should be elected as the leaders. However, there are two main obstacles in achieving this goal. First, without incentives for serving others, a node might behave selfishly by lying about its remaining resources and avoiding being elected. Second, electing an optimal collection of leaders to minimize the overall resource consumption may incur a prohibitive performance overhead, if such an election requires flooding the network. To address the issue of selfish nodes, we present a solution based on mechanism design theory. More specifically, the solution provides nodes with incentives in the form of reputations to encourage nodes in honestly participating in the election process. The amount of incentives is based on the Vic...

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2011
• Where: TDSC
• Authors: Noman Mohammed, Hadi Otrok, Lingyu Wang, Mourad Debbabi, Prabir Bhattacharya
• Keywords: Leader Election, Remaining Resources, Selfish Nodes, TDSC 2011, Theoretical Computer Science