Path coalitional games

We present a general framework to model strategic aspects and stable and fair resource allocations in networks via variants and generalizations of path coalitional games. In these games, a coalition of edges or vertices is successful if it can enable an s-t path. We present polynomial-time algorithms to compute and verify least core payoffs of cost-based generalizations of path coalitional games and their duals, thereby settling a number of open problems. The least core payoffs of path coalitional games are completely characterized and a polynomialtime algorithm for computing the nucleolus of edge path coalitional games on undirected series-parallel graphs is presented.

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2011
• Where: CORR
• Authors: Haris Aziz, Troels Bjerre Sørensen
• Keywords: Core Payoffs, CORR 2011, Education, Fair Resource Allocations, Path Coalitional Games