Pricing-based spectrum access control in cognitive radio networks with random access

Abstract—Market-based mechanisms offer promising approaches for spectrum access in cognitive radio networks. In this paper, we focus on two market models, one with a monopoly primary user (PU) market and the other with a multiple PU market, where each PU sells its temporarily unused spectrum to secondary users (SUs). We propose a pricing-based spectrum trading mechanism that enables SUs to contend for channel usage by random access, in a distributed manner, which naturally mitigates the complexity and time overhead associated with centralized scheduling. For the monopoly PU market model, we first consider SUs contending via slotted Aloha. The revenue maximization problems here are nonconvex. We first characterize the Pareto optimal region, and then obtain a Pareto optimal solution that maximizes the SUs’ throughput subject to the SUs’ budget constraints. To mitigate the spectrum underutilization due to the “price of contention,” we revisit the problem where SUs contend via ...

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2011
• Where: INFOCOM
• Authors: Lei Yang, Hongseok Kim, Junshan Zhang, Mung Chiang, Chee-Wei Tan
• Keywords: Communications, INFOCOM 2011, Nash Equilibrium, Pareto Optimal Solution, Spectrum Trading