Resettable Cryptography in Constant Rounds - The Case of Zero Knowledge

A fundamental question in cryptography deals with understanding the role that randomness plays in cryptographic protocols and to what extent it is necessary. One particular line of works was initiated by Canetti, Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Micali (STOC 2000) who introduced the notion of resettable zero-knowledge, where the protocol must be zeroknowledge even if a cheating verifier can reset the prover and have several interactions in which the prover uses the same random tape. Soon afterwards, Barak, Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Lindell (FOCS 2001) studied the setting where the verifier uses a fixed random tape in multiple interactions. Subsequent to these works, a number of papers studied the notion of resettable protocols in the setting where only one of the participating parties uses a fixed random tape multiple times. The notion of resettable security has been studied in two main models: the plain model and the bare public key model (also introduced in the above paper by Canetti...

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2011
• Where: ASIACRYPT
• Authors: Yi Deng, Dengguo Feng, Vipul Goyal, Dongdai Lin, Amit Sahai, Moti Yung
• Keywords: ASIACRYPT 2011, Cryptographic Protocols, Cryptology, Polynomial Number, Zero Knowledge