Improved Side Channel Cube Attacks on PRESENT

: The paper presents several improved side channel cube attacks on PRESENT based on single bit leakage model. Compared with the previous study of Yang et al in CANS 2009 [30], based on the same model of single bit leakage in the 3 rd round, we show that: if the PRESENT cipher structure is unknown, for the leakage bit 0, 32-bit key can be recovered within 27.17 chosen plaintexts; if the cipher structure is known, for the leakage bit 4,8,12, 48-bit key can be extracted by 2

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2011
• Where: IACR
• Authors: Xin-jie Zhao, Tao Wang, Shi-ze Guo
• Keywords: Bit Key, Cans, Cipher, IACR 2011