Multiagent Reinforcement Learning: Theoretical Framework and an Algorithm

In this paper, we adopt general-sum stochastic games as a framework for multiagent reinforcement learning. Our work extends previous work by Littman on zero-sum stochastic games to a broader framework. We design a multiagent Q-learning method under this framework, and prove that it converges to a Nash equilibrium under speci ed conditions. This algorithm is useful for nding the optimal strategy when there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in the game. When there exist multiple Nash equilibria in the game, this algorithm should be combined with other learning techniques to nd optimal strategies.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 1998
• Where: ICML
• Authors: Junling Hu, Michael P. Wellman
• Keywords: ICML 1998, Machine Learning, Multiple Nash Equilibria, Unique Nash Equilibrium, Zero-sum Stochastic Games