Defeating the Ben-Zvi, Blackburn, and Tsaban Attack on the Algebraic Eraser

The Algebraic Eraser Diffie–Hellman (AEDH) protocol was introduced in 2005 and published in 2006 by I. Anshel, M. Anshel, D. Goldfeld, and S. Lemieux as a protocol suitable for use on platforms with constrained computational resources, such as FPGAs, ASICs, and wireless sensors. It is a group-theoretic cryptographic protocol that allows two users to construct a shared secret via a Diffie–Hellman-type scheme over an insecure channel. Building on the refuted 2012 permutation-based attack of Kalka–Teichner–Tsaban (KKT), Ben-Zvi, Blackburn, and Tsaban (BBT) present a heuristic attack, published November 13, 2015, that attempts to recover the AEDH shared secret. In their paper BBT reference the AEDH protocol as presented to ISO for certification (ISO 29167-20) by SecureRF. The ISO 29167-20 draft contains two profiles using the Algebraic Eraser. One profile is unaffected by this attack; the second profile is subject to their attack provided the attack runs in real time. This is...

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2016
• Where: CORR
• Authors: Iris Anshel, Derek Atkins, Dorian Goldfeld, Paul E. Gunnells
• Keywords: CORR 2016, Education