Secondary Spectrum Auctions for Markets With Communication Constraints

—Auctions have been proposed as a way to provide economic incentives for primary users to dynamically allocate unused spectrum to other users in need of it. Previously proposed schemes do not take into account the fact that users power constraints might prevent them from transmitting their bid prices to the auctioneer with high precision, and that transmitted bid prices must travel through a noisy channel. These schemes also have very high overheads which cannot be accommodated in wireless standards. We propose auction schemes where a central clearing authority auctions spectrum to users who bid for it, while taking into account quantization of prices, feedback overheads and noise in the channel explicitly. Our schemes are closely related to channel output feedback problems and specifically to the technique of posterior matching. We consider several scenarios where the objective of the clearing authority is to award spectrum to the bidders who value spectrum the most. We prove theor...

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2016
• Where: TWC
• Authors: Deepan S. Palguna, David James Love, Ilya Pollak
• Keywords: TWC 2016