Beyond Plurality: Truth-Bias in Binary Scoring Rules

It is well known that standard game-theoretic approaches to voting mechanisms lead to a multitude of Nash Equilibria (NE), many of which are counter-intuitive. We focus on truth-biased voters, a model recently proposed to avoid such issues. The model introduces an incentive for voters to be truthful when their vote is not pivotal. This is a powerful refinement, and recent simulations reveal that the surviving equilibria tend to have desirable properties. However, truth-bias has been studied only within the context of plurality, which is

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2015
• Where: ALDT
• Authors: Svetlana Obraztsova, Omer Lev, Evangelos Markakis, Zinovi Rabinovich, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
• Keywords: ALDT 2015, Algorithms