Heterogeneous Facility Location without Money: (Doctoral Consortium)

The facility location problem is arguably the prototypical problem in the mechanism design without money’s research agenda. Motivated by the intrinsic limitations of the classical model on both (i) adequately modelling several real life scenarios and (ii) admitting truthful mechanisms having good approximation ratio, we introduce and study a novel, more realistic model of facility location, wherein facilities are heterogeneous and the agent’s cost model is dependent on the kind of facilities she is interested in. In this context, we study truthful mechanisms that optimize both utilitarian and non-utilitarian objective functions. Categories and Subject Descriptors I.2.11 [Distributed Artificial Intelligence]: Multiagent systems; J.4 [Social and Behavioral Science]: Economics Keywords Mechanism Design, Facility Location, Approximation Algorithms

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2015
• Where: ATAL
• Authors: Paolo Serafino
• Keywords: ATAL 2015, Intelligent Agents