Many encrypted database (EDB) systems have been proposed in the last few years as cloud computing has grown in popularity and data breaches have increased. The stateof-the-art EDB systems for relational databases can handle SQL queries over encrypted data and are competitive with commercial database systems. These systems, most of which are based on the design of CryptDB (SOSP 2011), achieve these properties by making use of property-preserving encryption schemes such as deterministic (DTE) and orderpreserving encryption (OPE). In this paper, we study the concrete security provided by such systems. We present a series of attacks that recover the plaintext from DTE- and OPE-encrypted database columns using only the encrypted column and publicly-available auxiliary information. We consider well-known attacks, including frequency analysis and sorting, as well as new attacks based on combinatorial optimization. We evaluate these attacks empirically in an electronic medical records (EMR) s...
Muhammad Naveed, Seny Kamara, Charles V. Wright