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STOC
2009
ACM

A new approach to auctions and resilient mechanism design

14 years 11 months ago
A new approach to auctions and resilient mechanism design
We put forward a new approach to mechanism design, and exemplify it via a new mechanism guaranteeing significant revenue in unrestricted combinatorial auctions. Our mechanism ? succeeds in a new and very adversarial collusion model; ? works in a new, equilibrium-less, and very strong solution concept; ? benchmarks its performance against the knowledge that the players have about each other; ? is computationally efficient and preserves the players' privacy to an unusual extent.
Jing Chen, Silvio Micali
Added 23 Nov 2009
Updated 23 Nov 2009
Type Conference
Year 2009
Where STOC
Authors Jing Chen, Silvio Micali
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