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PODC
2009
ACM

Concurrent imitation dynamics in congestion games

15 years 4 hour ago
Concurrent imitation dynamics in congestion games
Imitating successful behavior is a natural and frequently applied approach to trust in when facing scenarios for which we have little or no experience upon which we can base our decision. In this paper, we consider such behavior in atomic congestion games. We propose to study concurrent imitation dynamics that emerge when each player samples another player and possibly imitates this agents' strategy if the anticipated latency gain is sufficiently large. Our main focus is on convergence properties. Using a potential function argument, we show that our dynamics converge in a monotonic fashion to stable states. In such a state none of the players can improve its latency by imitating somebody else. As our main result, we show rapid convergence to approximate equilibria. At an approximate equilibrium only a small fraction of agents sustains a latency significantly above or below average. In particular, imitation dynamics behave like fully polynomial time approximation schemes (FPTAS)....
Heiner Ackermann, Petra Berenbrink, Simon Fischer,
Added 25 Nov 2009
Updated 25 Nov 2009
Type Conference
Year 2009
Where PODC
Authors Heiner Ackermann, Petra Berenbrink, Simon Fischer, Martin Hoefer
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