Simultaneous Hardcore Bits and Cryptography against Memory Attacks

This paper considers two questions in cryptography. Cryptography Secure Against Memory Attacks. A particularly devastating side-channel attack against cryptosystems, termed the "memory attack", was proposed recently. In this attack, a significant fraction of the bits of a secret key of a cryptographic algorithm can be measured by an adversary if the secret key is ever stored in a part of memory which can be accessed even after power has been turned off for a short amount of time. Such an attack has been shown to completely compromise the security of various cryptosystems in use, including the RSA cryptosystem and AES. We show that the public-key encryption scheme of Regev (STOC 2005), and the identity-based encryption scheme of Gentry, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan (STOC 2008) are remarkably robust against memory attacks where the adversary can measure a large fraction of the bits of the secret-key, or more generally, can compute an arbitrary function of the secret-key of bounde...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2009
• Where: TCC
• Authors: Adi Akavia, Shafi Goldwasser, Vinod Vaikuntanathan
• Keywords: Cryptography, Input Bits, One-way Function F(x, Simultaneous Hardcore Bits, TCC 2009