Secure compilation of a multi-tier web language

Storing state in the client tier (in forms or cookies, for example) improves the efficiency of a web application, but it also renders the secrecy and integrity of stored data vulnerable to untrustworthy clients. We study this general problem in the context of the LINKS multi-tier web-programming language. Like other systems, LINKS stores unencrypted application data, including web continuations, on the client tier; hence, LINKS is open to attacks that expose secrets, and modify control flow and application data. We characterise these attacks as failures of the general principle that security properties of multi-tier applications should follow simply from review of the source code (as opposed to the detailed study of the files compiled for each tier, for example). We propose a secure compilation strategy, which uses authenticated encryption to eliminate these threats, and we implement it as a simple extension to the LINKS system. We model this compilation strategy as a translation f...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2009
• Where: TLDI
• Authors: Ioannis G. Baltopoulos, Andrew D. Gordon
• Keywords: Compilation Strategy, Formal Methods, Multi-tier Web-programming Language, Secure Compilation Strategy, TLDI 2009