An Auction-Based Incentive Mechanism for Non-Altruistic Cooperative ARQ via Spectrum-Leasing

— We propose and analyze a novel decentralized mechanism that motivates otherwise non-cooperative stations to participate as relays in cooperative ARQ protocol. Cooperation incentive is provided by the possibility for the source to lease a portion of retransmission slot for the traffic of relaying terminals. To further leverage the opportunistic nature of cooperative ARQ and obtain a fully decentralized solution, the (motivated) relaying nodes compete for access to the retransmission slot by trying to make the best retransmission offer. Effective arbitration of cooperative retransmissions is performed using auction theory (bidding), with the source in the role of the auctioneer, the relaying nodes acting as the bidders and the (use of the) retransmission slot as the bidding article. It is noted that the proposed solution can be seen as a practical framework for the implementation of cognitive radio networks running according to the property-rights model (spectrum leasing). Numerical...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2009
• Where: GLOBECOM
• Authors: Igor Stanojev, Osvaldo Simeone, Umberto Spagnolini, Yeheskel Bar-Ness, Raymond L. Pickholtz
• Keywords: Cooperative Arq, Cooperative Arq Protocol, GLOBECOM 2009, Retransmission Slot, Telecommunications