Abstract. This paper estimates the minimal length of a binary probabilistic traitor tracing code. We consider the code construction proposed by G. Tardos in 2003, with the symmetric accusation function as improved by B. Skoric et al. The length estimation is based on two pillars. First, we consider the Worst Case Attack that a group of c colluders can lead. This attack minimizes the mutual information between the code sequence of a colluder and the pirated sequence. Second, an algorithm pertaining to the field of rare event analysis is presented in order to estimate the probabilities of error: the probability that an innocent user is framed, and the probabilities that all colluders are missed. Therefore, for a given collusion size, we are able to estimate the minimal length of the code satisfying some error probabilities constraints. This estimation is far lower than the known lower bounds. Key words: Traitor tracing, Fingerprinting, Tardos code, Rare event