An Exploration of Type Indeterminacy in Strategic Decision-Making

In this paper we explore an extention of the Type Indeterminacy model of decision-making to strategic decision-making. A 2X2 game is investigated. We first show that in a one-shot simultaneaous move setting the TI-model is equivalent to a standard incomplete information model. We then let the game be preceded by a cheap-talk promise exchange game. We show in an example that in the TI-model the promise stage can have impact on next following behavior while the standard classical model predicts no impact whatsoever. The TI approach differs from other behavioral approaches in identifying the source of the effect of cheap-talk promises in the intrinsic indeterminacy of the type.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2009
• Where: QI
• Authors: Jerome R. Busemeyer, Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky
• Keywords: Cheap-talk Promises, Physics, Promise Exchange Game, QI 2009, Type Indeterminacy Model